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IS MODEL T RATTLE-FREE? A REPLY TO HASKER 
Thomas P. Flint 
In "Getting that Model T Back on the Road: Thomas Flint on Incarnation and 
Mereology," William Hasker contends that the reasons I offered for being 
dissatisfied with Model T, a mereological model of the incarnation, are in-
sufficient. I argue, though, that Hasker's defense of Model T is inadequate; 
though Christians may not want to consign it to the junkyard, they should at 
least be open to trading it in for a better model. 
Wil l i am Hasker's "Getting that Mode l T Back on the Road" focuses on an 
argument I presented which cast doubt upon the model of the incarnation 
that I referred to as Mode l T.1 O n this model, the Son (W) takes on as a 
part the created body/soul composite (CHN) which is added to his divine-
substance-plus-whatever (D) to form the incarnate Son. The argument 
(labeled Argument F by Hasker), a variation on a well-known traditional 
argument (sometimes called "the growing argument") against the claim 
that things can add parts, compares a wor ld in which the Son does become 
incarnate (Y) wi th one in which he doesn't (N) and proceeds as follows: 
(1) W in Y = W in N . 
(2) W in N = D in N . 
(3) D in N = D in Y. 
(4) W in Y = D in Y. 
Since (4) seems to fol low f rom (1) through (3) and is inconsistent wi th 
Mode l T, the argument suggests, Mode l T needs to be surrendered—wnless 
we can find plausible grounds for rejecting one or another of the premises. 
However, none of the typical grounds for denying any of (1) through (3), 
I argued, offers us a particularly palatable metaphysical picture of the 
'See Wi l l i am Hasker, "Getting that M o d e l T Back on the Road: Thomas Flint on Incar-
nation and Mereology," Faith and Philosophy 32, no. 2 (this issue), 172-176. Hasker (172) 
says that m y argument is designed "to show that M o d e l T is untenable." This is a bit of 
an overstatement. M y aim in presenting this argument was not to suggest that M o d e l T is 
beyond the pale, but only that fu l ly embracing it involves a higher cost than might init ially 
be thought. More on this anon. 
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incarnation. Hence, I concluded, "we have some reason to doubt" the ad¬
equacy of Mode l T.2 
Hasker begs to differ. A crucial question, he says, is whether or not D 
can have parts added to it. If it can, he says, then W is simply identical 
wi th D , and (4) is true but innocuous. If D can't take on new parts, he says, 
then D is clearly not identical wi th W (since the latter, according to Mode l 
T, does take on a new part i n the incarnation), in which case (2) must be 
false. Either way, Mode l T is "good to go." 3 
Now, I don't think this is quite right. Whether or not D itself can take 
on new parts is not the issue. Mode l T insists that W in fact takes on a new 
part in the incarnation, and that D is only a proper part of the incarnate 
Son. But whether D can grow by adding a new part is a question on which 
Mode l T, as I understand it, is simply noncommittal. The whole point of 
Mode l T is that W has in fact "grown" by becoming incarnate; W has in fact 
added a part (namely, C H N ) . Whether or not D can grow is neither here 
nor there. So Hasker's approach here strikes me as off-base. 
Still, there may well be something correct in Hasker's suggestion that 
rejecting (2) is the route that many Christians intent on maintaining Mode l 
T w i l l find most plausible. After all, most Christians w i l l presumably find 
(1) incontestable. (3) seems a tad less stable—as I point out, it could be 
rejected by one who thinks that D itself would cease to exist once C H N 
were added to it, even though D's components would continue. 4 Still, the 
idea that the Son's divine-substance-plus-whatever ceases to be as a con¬
sequence of his becoming incarnate is likely to strike many Christians as 
simply too much to swallow. So for them, if (4) is to be avoided, as it needs 
to be for Mode l T to keep running, (2) needs to be surrendered. 
A n d this, Hasker suggests, is all we need to say. True, Hasker ac¬
knowledges, there remains "the problem of explaining what the relation 
between the Son and D in fact is" such that (2) could turn out false. A n d 
yes, he agrees, I had argued i n my earlier paper that all of the prominent 
metaphysical principles that might warrant a negative verdict on (2) are 
themselves beset with significant difficulties. But all of this, he maintains, 
is beside the point. For his purposes, he says, "it is sufficient to show that 
Argument F is unsound. A n d this I have done, by showing that, given 
the other assumptions in play here, premise (2) of Argument F cannot 
possibly be true." 5 
Now, as I noted above, part of Hasker's case against (2) is based on the 
unwarranted assumption that because D does not gain parts on Model T, 
it cannot gain parts. Still, I believe that Hasker has a point (or at least half 
2See my "Should Concretists Part wi th Mereological Models of the Incarnation?," in The 
Metaphysics of the Incarnation, ed. A n n a Marmodoro and Jonathan H i l l (Oxford: Oxford U n i -
versity Press, 2011), 79. 
3 Hasker, "Getting that M o d e l T Back on the Road," 176. 
4 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Flint, "Should Concretists Part," 77-78. 
5 Hasker, "Getting that M o d e l T Back on the Road," 175. 
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a point) here. A s we have seen, if the truth of (1) and (3), along with the 
viability of Mode l T, are among the "assumptions in play here," then (2) is 
all that's left; it has to be false, given our assumptions. 
But is that really all that needs to be said? I think not. If one is going 
to offer a coherent overall theory of the incarnation using Model T, and if 
(1) and (3) are to be maintained, then one needs to be able to tell a story 
of how it is that W and D are related, a story that (among other things) 
justifies our rejection of (2). In my earlier paper, I examined the most-
discussed means of discrediting the parallel to (2) i n the generic growing 
argument: affirming distinct but mereologically coincident objects, or 
denying that numerical sameness entails identity, or saying that adding 
parts to an object results in the creation of a new thing—the part of the 
enlarged object that does not include the newly-added parts. (It is not 
without reason that Eric Olson calls this last option "the way of funny 
persistence conditions." 6) While I admitted that each of these views is ten¬
able, serious problems wi th each—especially when applied to the case at 
issue, the incarnation—were also discussed. 7 If we find these problems 
serious enough—and I think many if not most Christians will—then the 
minimal Haskerian defense of Mode l T seems to me to be inadequate. 
Perhaps we can justifiably believe, as Hasker says, that there has to be some-
thing wrong with (2) for Mode l T to survive. But unless we can offer some 
credible account of just what is wrong wi th it, then our defense of that 
model can't be seen as fu l ly satisfactory. 
A parallel might prove helpful here. Suppose an innocent orthodox 
theist were to be confronted for the first time with the fol lowing version of 
the deductive argument f rom evil . 
(5) E v i l (lots of it, or gratuitous instances, or horrendous examples— 
imagine the claim here being ful ly filled out in one way or another) 
exists. 
(6) If an all-good, all-knowing, morally perfect G o d existed, there 
would be no evil (or not lots of it, or not gratuitous instances, or not 
horrendous examples). 
Therefore, 
(7) There is no all-good, all-knowing, morally perfect God . 
Well, our imaginary theist says, I do indeed assume that (5) is true. But I 
also assume that there is a G o d who has the attributes affirmed by (7). So 
given the assumptions in play here, (6) is all that's left; hence, it has to be 
false. The end. 
Now, many of us would no doubt wish to see our innocent orthodox 
theist freed f rom the fetters of this atheological argument. Still, surely this 
6 Eric Olson, "The Paradox of Increase," The Monist 89 (2006), 406. 
7 Flint , "Should Concretists Part," 7^77 . 
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is a case of premature emancipation. Maybe our theist is right in thinking 
that (6) is the weak spot in the argument. But that recognition should be 
the beginning, not the end, of a response. Some explanation of why we 
should think (6) is not beyond reproach is called for here—a free w i l l de¬
fense, or a greater goods defense, or a soul-building defense, or an appeal 
to our epistemic limitations, or something else. To the extent that (6) has 
some prima facie plausibility, and to the extent that nothing can be said to 
besmirch (6), or nothing at least that does not depend upon some highly 
questionable philosophical principle, our theist has not really come to 
grips with the atheological argument. 
The same goes for the advocate of Mode l T when confronted wi th 
Argument F. Indeed, things here are even worse. For our innocent or¬
thodox theist, there really is no alternative to denying (7). If (7) is true, the 
game is up, and not in a manner to our theist's l iking. But things are very 
different wi th regard to Argument F. If that argument succeeds, it's not 
traditional theism that's endangered. Indeed, it's not even the doctrine of 
the incarnation. What falls is simply Mode l T. A n d Mode l T is merely one 
model among many which have been offered in attempts to illuminate 
the doctrine. So one would think that the failure to be able to offer a fu l l 
and convincing justification for the denial of (2) should lead a reflective 
Christian at least to call that model into question. 
For a non-philosophical parallel, consider the fol lowing story. Lieu¬
tenant Tennant is investigating a murder, and f rom the start considers 
Harpo the prime suspect. There are other possibilities—Groucho, Chico, 
and Zeppo all look suspicious—but Tennant is fairly confident it was 
Harpo. After a friendly five-hour interrogation at the police station, Harpo 
finally breaks his silence and signs a confession explaining how and why 
the murder took place. So Tennant is all but certain he has the true story 
of the crime (call this story T). But then his partner, Sergeant Striver, ar¬
rives at the station wi th new information. The murder was committed i n 
Detroit at 7:00, but Striver has found witnesses who place Harpo in South 
Bend (enjoying duck soup at Sorin's) at 6:00—and you can't get f rom 
South Bend to Detroit i n an hour. Clearly, this information seems to con¬
flict wi th T. But Tennant is reluctant to surrender his theory. "We're pretty 
confident about the time and place of the crime," says Tennant to Striver. 
"And we know the distance between the two cities. But how about that 
South Bend alibi? I have a feeling it's horsefeathers! Do I still like Harpo 
for the murder? You bet your life I do!" Obviously, there are many ways 
in which the alibi could prove to be bogus: the witnesses could be lying, 
or mistaken as to time, or place, or person. Suppose Tennant investigates 
the alibi, though, and discovers that none of these means of discrediting 
the witnesses is very plausible; he'd like to tell a story, consistent wi th all 
the evidence, that doesn't place Harpo i n South Bend at 6:00, but none 
of the possibilities he comes up wi th is truly credible. So what should 
Tennant do? Perhaps he' l l still hold Harpo on suspicion of murder. But 
given that there are other live candidates, shouldn't his confidence in T 
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waver? A t the very least, shouldn't he give Groucho, Chico, and Zeppo 
second looks? 
Something akin to this, it seems to me, is true with Mode l T. Argument F 
doesn't prove (and was never intended to prove) that Mode l T needs to be 
abandoned. Nevertheless, that argument does suggest that a fleshed-out 
picture of the incarnation based on Mode l T ultimately depends upon one 
or another metaphysical thesis (relative identity, or distinct but mereologi-
cally coincident objects, or . . .) that is questionable when applied to the 
generic growing argument and even more questionable when applied to 
the incarnation. If there were no tenable alternatives to Mode l T, perhaps 
one would have no choice but to bite the bullet and embrace whichever 
of these theses one finds least unappealing in the case of the incarnation. 8 
But of course there are plenty of tenable (or at least seemingly tenable) al¬
ternative models—including habitus models, instrumental models, Mode l 
A , condensation models, and ownership models, to name just the five I 
considered in my earlier paper.9 What Argument F shows, I think, is that 
the costs associated with holding on to Mode l T are high enough that one 
should, at the very least, give those alternatives second looks. 
Hasker concludes his paper by suggesting that a perspicacious meta¬
physical mechanic would tell his customer that Mode l T is just fine. I 
suspect, though, that the sound of telltale rattles are going to reappear 
soon after the driver leaves the shop. Perhaps the motorist w i l l decide he 
can live wi th them. But if he's sensible, he should at least look around to 
see what else is available. 1 0 
University of Notre Dame 
8 O f course, one might also hold on to M o d e l T by asserting that one or another of these 
theses must be true, but without actually aff i rming any particular one. Do ing so absolves 
one of the problems associated wi th defending any of the specific theses, though at the cost 
of rendering one's model metaphysically rather hollow. In our detective scenario, it w o u l d 
be parallel to Tennant's deciding that one or another of the ways of discrediting Harpo's alibi 
must be true, even though Tennant finds none of those ways credible enough actually to 
defend. Would a prosecutor feel comfortable proceeding wi th such a case? 
9See Flint, "Should Concretists Part," 79-86. 
1 0 M y commentary on Hasker's essay is deeply indebted to exchanges both wi th Hasker 
and wi th Joseph Jedwab. 
